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This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of Irish mortgage arrears using a new loan-level dataset which
incorporates data from four Irish banks. We identify the main characteristics of accounts in arrears and
examine the role of ability-to-pay and equity factors in the recent hike in mortgage delinquency rates. We
ﬁnd that borrowers who took out their mortgage for buy-to-let purposes, those with high loan-to-value
ratios and those with high repayment burdens are all more likely to be in arrears. This is also the case
for borrowers with properties in regions that have suﬀered more severe economic shocks, as proxied for by
changes in the regional unemployment rate. Our empirical analysis suggests that aﬀordability issues and
general macroeconomic developments have had an important and sizeable eﬀect on arrears trends over time,
suggesting that policy eﬀorts to target the growing level of mortgage arrears need to take account of these
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2Non Technical Summary
The economic crisis that has engulfed the Irish economy in recent years has been associated with
a marked deterioration in the Irish housing market and a sharp increase in mortgage arrears. By
the end of June 2011, 7.2 percent of residential mortgage accounts were in arrears to the tune of
90 or more days; taking account of loans that have been restructured and arrears of less than 90
days puts this ﬁgure at almost 20 percent. In this paper, we explore the factors associated with the
recent rapid rise in arrears in Ireland and present a comprehensive overview of the characteristics
of accounts in diﬃculty.
We use a subset of a new loan-level dataset that was collected as part of the Central Bank of
Ireland’s March 2011 bank stress testing exercise for our study. We analyse the performance of
over 420,000 mortgage loan accounts, accounting for approximately 50 percent of the stock of Irish
mortgages outstanding at the end of 2010. For each loan account, a wide array of information is
available that captures borrower and mortgage characteristics (usually at point of loan origination)
and details on repayment behaviour throughout 2010. For a subset of borrowers with one bank we
also have monthly data on individual loan performance back to mid-2008.
Our analysis points to higher arrears among borrowers who took out their mortgage for buy-
to-let purposes, among those with high loan-to-value ratios or high repayment burdens and among
those with properties in regions that have suﬀered severe economic shocks. Our empirical exercise
suggests that aﬀordability issues and general macroeconomic developments have had an important
and sizeable eﬀect on arrears trends over time.
In terms of future developments, we argue that while improvements in the macroeconomic en-
vironment will be important in helping to stall the rate of growth in arrears, reducing the build-up
of arrears to date will take a signiﬁcant amount of time and resources. The sizeable income shocks
Irish borrowers have faced in recent years means that there is likely to be a large group of borrowers
amongst those in deep arrears that are in a long-term unsustainable debt position - based on our
sample of borrowers, we estimate that 40 percent of borrowers in 90-plus days arrears have been in
that position for a year or more. Addressing the problems faced by these borrowers should be at
the core of any strategy for reducing the pool of delinquent borrowers. This is likely to represent a
signiﬁcant challenge for policy makers and banks in the coming years.
31 Introduction
The economic crisis that has engulfed Ireland in recent years has severely impacted the Irish housing
market. Falling incomes and rising unemployment have left many borrowers struggling to service
outstanding mortgage debt. Figures from the Central Bank of Ireland (2011b) for the end of June
2011 show 7.2 percent of private residential mortgage accounts in arrears for 90 days or more.
Including those loans that have had some form of restructuring plus loans in arrears of less than 90
days sees the ﬁgure rise to almost 20 percent, implying that almost one in ﬁve mortgage holders are
facing, or have faced, some form of diﬃculty meeting their repayments. Identifying the appropriate
response to this situation represents a signiﬁcant challenge to both lenders and policy makers. Thus
far, the approach to dealing with distressed borrowers has been mainly characterised by extensive
and long periods of forbearance. In deciding how to address the problem in a more proactive manner,
it will be important to have an understanding of the key drivers of mortgage arrears. The purpose
of this paper is to contribute to this understanding by providing a detailed picture of borrowers in
arrears and the factors associated with the evolution of mortgage arrears over time.
The primary data source that we use for our analysis includes a new loan-level dataset collected
as part of the Central Bank of Ireland’s March 2011 bank stress testing exercise. The sample of
loans covers the four Irish banks included in the 2011 Financial Measures Programme (Central
Bank of Ireland, 2011).1 We analyse the performance of over 420,000 mortgage loans, accounting
for approximately 50 percent of the stock of Irish mortgages outstanding at the end of 2010. For
each loan account, a wide array of information is available that captures borrower and mortgage
characteristics (usually at point of loan origination) and details on repayment behaviour throughout
2010. For a subset of borrowers with one bank we also have monthly data on individual loan
performance back to mid-2008 for a sample of 125,000 loans. Recent papers by Kelly (2011) and
Kennedy and McIndoe Calder (2011) use the same data source to analyse the Irish mortgage market.
The sample of loans used in this paper represents a sub-set of the full loan book, in particular we
have selected loans where accurate information on gross household income at loan origination was
provided.
The existing international literature provides some guidance on the causes of mortgage arrears,
suggesting that “ability-to-pay” and “equity” factors are both important. A borrower’s ability-to-pay
their mortgage can be aﬀected by either income or payment shocks. Payment shocks can arise due
to changes in interest rates - a particularly relevant factor for the Irish market where the majority
of borrowers are on some form of variable interest rate - or changes in the mortgage contract. The
equity-theory posits negative equity as the key driver of default or arrears. Negative equity can aﬀect
borrowers in two ways. First, it can prevent borrowers who have experienced income shocks from
trading out of their diﬃculties, either by re-mortgaging or trading down. Second, some negative
equity borrowers may be incentivised to default when the ﬁnancial gains of defaulting outweigh
the costs of continuing to service the mortgage, thus treating the mortgage as an option. Given
the prominence of the US mortgage crisis, there is an extensive recent literature on the drivers of
1The four banks are: Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life and Permanent and the Educational Building
Society (EBS).
1mortgage default for prime and sub-prime borrowers, see for example Gerardi et al. (2008) and
Foote et al. (2008). Aron and Muellbauer (2010) provide a comprehensive analysis for the UK and
also include a detailed typology of UK empirical studies on mortgage arrears and repossessions. As
to which of the two eﬀects is most important, the general consensus is that it is some combination
of the two factors that act as a “double-trigger” for mortgage default. In some cases it is argued that
the equity eﬀect dominates, except when negative equity is at a low level. Bhutta et al (2010) argue
that when negative equity is above -10 percent among their sample of U.S. non-prime borrowers,
liquidity shocks and life events drive default. On the other hand, they also ﬁnd that when a borrower
has signiﬁcant negative equity (greater than -50 percent) the equity eﬀect dominates.
From a policy perspective, it is vital to understand if ability-to-pay, equity factors, or some mix
of both drive mortgage arrears since policies to alleviate distress will diﬀer depending on the relative
importance of both factors. If it is the case, for example, that unemployment related income loss
is the primary cause of the escalation in mortgage arrears, then the appropriate policy response
might include measures which help to alleviate temporary shortfalls in income. On the other hand,
if negative equity is a key factor determining mortgage arrears, then a policy response will have to
take this into account.
In this paper, we adopt a dual approach to analysing mortgage arrears and assessing the impact
of ability-to-pay and equity factors on recent arrears trends: ﬁrst, we exploit the four bank loan-level
dataset, draw out key descriptive statistics from our data and undertake a static regression analysis
for December 2010. The idea here is to enhance our understanding of the types of borrowers who
are in diﬃculties and to quantify the importance of the various factors that impact mortgage arrears
in the Irish case. As a second step, we narrow our focus to the subset of the loan-level data for
which we have a long time series of data. We undertake a dynamic regression analysis, drawing
lessons from the ﬁrst step on which variables are quantitatively and economically important for the
Irish case. The analysis in the second stage is at a portfolio and regional level, comparing trends in
loan performance with trends in key macroeconomic factors, such as unemployment, house prices
(through loan-to-value ratios) and rental rates. In both cases our results suggest that aﬀordability
issues and general macroeconomic developments had an important and sizeable eﬀect on recent
trends in Irish mortgage arrears. For the buy-to-let market, there is some evidence to suggest that
equity factors are also important.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section we describe the data. Section
3 follows with an overview of recent trends in Irish mortgage arrears and presents information on the
borrower and mortgage characteristics of those in arrears. In Section 4 we model mortgage arrears
and identify the key factors related to the recent hike in mortgage delinquency rates in Ireland.
Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
22 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The dataset used in this paper was collected as part of the March 2011 stress-testing exercise
undertaken by the Central Bank of Ireland to assess the potential capital requirements of the Irish
banks under various stress scenarios.2 The dataset contains a snapshot of loan-level information
for the entire residential mortgage books outstanding at the end of December 2010 for four Irish
banks. A wide array of information is captured for each loan in our dataset, including for example,
information on repayment performance over at least the 13 months to the end of December 2010
(for three of the banks), information on borrower, property and mortgage characteristics (usually
from the point of loan origination) and information on the current outstanding balance and current
repayment terms applying to each loan.3
We have data for 421,890 loans, secured against 323,388 properties. We identify the “primary
loan” for each property as the original mortgage loan. The additional 98,502 loans are equity release
loans. Table 1 shows a breakdown of our sample by year of loan origination. The third column
shows that the largest number of primary loans (just over 70,000) was extended in 2006, when house
prices were close to their peak.
For the static analysis of mortgage arrears that follows, we focus on loan accounts at the total
property level, a sample size of 323,388. This means that we aggregate up all outstanding balances
and arrears amounts on all loans secured on the same property to arrive at total property debt and
total property arrears ﬁgures. We do this so that we can get an accurate picture of the current
loan-to-value ratio (or equity position) faced by a borrower for an individual property. If we instead
undertook our analysis at the individual loan level, then we would substantially under-estimate the
current loan-to-value ratio on loans which were taken out as an equity release. For each property level
account we take the initial borrower and mortgage characteristics attached to the primary loan. We
also augment the loan-level data with information on yearly changes in county level unemployment
rates, so that local economic trends can be incorporated into our analysis of mortgage arrears. The
county level unemployment data are from the Central Statistics Oﬃce. Table 2 compares the balance
and arrears rates among our loan sample with the population of loans that were outstanding at the
end of 2010.
The outcome variable of interest in our study is whether or not a borrower is at least 90 days in
arrears at a point in time. Since our analysis of mortgage arrears is conducted at the total property
level, this means that a loan is deemed to be at least 90 days in arrears when the ratio of the total
property arrears balance to the total property monthly repayment is greater than or equal to three.
2.1 Creation of Additional Variables
We use the current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio to capture how equity factors aﬀect mortgage arrears
while we use a mortgage-repayment-to-income (MRTI) measure and changes in local unemployment
2Full details of the stress testing exercise and the loan level data are provided in The Financial Measures Programme
Report, available for download from www.centralbank.ie.
3A detailed description of the loan-level dataset is available in Kennedy and McIndoe Calder (2011).
3rates to capture the impact of ability-to-pay factors. The calculation of the LTV ratio and the
MRTI ratio is discussed below.
2.1.1 Loan-to-Value Ratio
To capture housing equity for each property in our sample we need two pieces of information: the
current value of the property and the loan outstanding on the property. In terms of the latter, we
add up the current balance outstanding on all loans secured on the same property to derive a total
property debt ﬁgure. In terms of the former, our dataset includes the value of the house for which
the original mortgage was taken out as well as the valuation date. We calculate the value of the
property (P) at time (t) as follows:




where P0 is the value of the property at the time of loan origination, and P t
P 0 is the change in the
average value of ‘similar’ properties between t=0 and t=t.
We use the CSO property price index to calculate the change in house prices over time. We match
‘similar’ properties on the basis of region (Dublin and non-Dublin) and type (house, apartment,
other). The CSO index only goes back to 2003. Prior to 2003 we use the ptsb/ESRI house price
index, which has a similar geographic breakdown, but not a similar breakdown by property type.
We therefore apply the ptsb/ESRI price index changes to all house-types. Our loan-to-value ratio





We plot the annual change in house prices according to both the CSO and ptsb/ESRI house
prices indices in Figure 1. In Figure 2 we show the distribution of housing equity across our sample,
as at end December 2010. About 65 percent of our sample has positive equity in their properties,
as indicated by a current loan-to-value ratio of 100 or less. Another 18 percent of our sample is
in negative equity which accounts for up to 20 percent of the value of the underlying property
(captured by those with a current loan-to-value ratio of between 100 and 120). The majority of the
remaining portion of our sample has negative equity somewhere in the region of 20 to 40 percent.
Kennedy and McIndoe Calder (2011) provide a detailed description of the negative equity situation
as at end-2010.
2.1.2 The Mortgage Repayment-to-Income Ratio
The mortgage repayment-to-income ratio (MRTI) captures the share of a borrower’s income that is
committed to paying interest and principal on its mortgage debt and therefore provides a valuable
4insight into the ability of a household to service its mortgage. To calculate the ratio, we need
information on the total mortgage repayment facing a borrower - this is already available in our
dataset. We also need information on the current income of a borrower. A weakness of our loan
level dataset is that it only incorporates information on gross household income at the time of loan
origination. In the absence of an alternative, we use this as a proxy for a borrower’s current income.
More speciﬁcally, we update income at origination to 2010 levels using information on how average
household incomes have changed since the time when a borrower’s loan was originated:




where Y2010 is the estimated borrower gross income in 2010; Y0 is the reported borrower gross income
at point of loan origination; and Y2010
Y0 is the change in average incomes between t=0 and t=2010.
To estimate the latter term in equation (3) - the change in a borrower’s income since loan origina-
tion - we refer to the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) which captures developments
in household incomes in Ireland. The latest available survey is for 2009, while the survey has only
been undertaken on a full year basis since 2004. To arrive at an estimate for 2010, we apply the
percentage change in gross national income (from the National Income and Expenditure Accounts -
at current market prices) between 2009 and 2010 to all borrowers’ estimated 2009 income. Table 3
reports the annual average change in household income for each year from 2004 to 2010 that we
apply to our data.
We calculate our MRTI ratio for each property-level account. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of the MRTI ratio across our sample. Roughly 60 percent of our sample had an MRTI ratio of
up to 20 percent; a further 20 percent of our sample had a mortgage repayment which consumed
between 20 and 25 percent of gross borrower income. Of the remaining 20 percent of our sample,
most faced an MRTI ratio of between 25 and 35 percent of gross borrower income.4 A weakness in
our MRTI measure is that measurement error in income is likely to be positively correlated with our
dependent variable. This is because borrowers that have experienced signiﬁcant income shocks, such
as unemployment, and are not captured by our “average-changes” approach, are also, a priori, more
likely to be in arrears. We believe that the MRTI variable should more appropriately be viewed as
capturing borrower credit quality characteristics at origination, rather than actually measuring the
current repayment burden. This is less of an issue for our regional portfolio approach, as discussed
later.
2.2 Overview of Dataset
Table 4 provides an overview of borrower and mortgage characteristics by year of loan origination of
the primary loan. The ﬁrst three rows show the proportion of accounts that recorded any (row 1),
4Note that the MRTI ratio reports mortgage repayments as a proportion of gross borrower income. For this reason,
the ﬁgures are not directly comparable to those presented in previous studies which have looked at the distribution
of the MRTI (measured using net income) among mortgaged Irish households (Kelly et al (2011) for example).
560-90 days (row 2) or 90 days or more arrears (row 3) during December 2010. Whilst 12.5 percent of
accounts were in arrears in December 2010, many of these accounts recorded a low level of arrears;
only 5.2 percent of accounts had arrears which equalled 90 or more days worth of payments.5 In all
three cases, the arrears rate was highest for loans originating in 2007, when house prices were close
to their peak.
As house prices increased up to 2007, so did the average mortgage size, which peaked at e256,000
in 2007 (row 4). By 2010, the average mortgage, at e185,000, had fallen back to levels last seen in
2004. Loans originating in 2007 also have the highest level of outstanding balance at end-2010, at
e242,000. This ﬁgure takes account of equity releases or other top-up loans against the property
that were taken out since the property was purchased. Given all of the above, it is unsurprising
that we ﬁnd that loans originating in 2007 also have the highest average current LTV, at almost 87
percent (row 7). For comparison, the average LTV for loans originating in 2010, albeit a smaller
number of transactions, is 64.7 percent.
Gross household income averaged e75,000 at the point of loan origination for the borrowers in
our sample, while the highest reported income was recorded for loans originated in 2008 (at e80,000)
(row 9). Interestingly, the average loan-to-income ratio for all borrowers is 3.0, whereas for the peak
year of the boom (2007) the ratio was 3.2 (row 4/row 9). Over our sample for 2004-2010, we estimate
that borrower income at the end of 2010 averaged e74,000 (row 10). Only loans originated over
the period 2007-2009 are estimated to be associated with lower borrower income at the end of 2010
relative to when the loans were originated. The mortgage repayment-to-income ratio is estimated
to average 18.9 in our sample, implying that the average borrower faces mortgage repayments that
consume almost one ﬁfth of that borrower’s gross income.
In rows 12 to 14 we present a breakdown of the primary mortgages by buyer type.6 First time
buyers account for almost 40 percent of the number of primary mortgages outstanding at end-2010,
while 15 per cent of mortgages are accounted for by ‘buy-to-let’ borrowers. The remaining loans are
accounted for by ‘next-time buyers’ (trade-up and trade-down) and other categories. It is interesting
to note that the share of ﬁrst time buyers increased substantially among loans originating in 2010
while the share of buy-to-let borrowers fell by a sizeable amount. Rows 15 to 17 provide a breakdown
of interest rate types by year of origination. At the end of 2010, 17.9 percent of the primary loans
in our sample were ﬁxed rate mortgages, 30 percent were variable rate mortgages and the remaining
52 percent were tracker mortgages. These average ﬁgures disguise the rapid rise and fall of tracker
loans, peaking at 74 percent of loans originating in 2007 and falling to practically zero by 2010.
The ﬁnal rows in Table 4 show the geographic breakdown of the primary loan sample using the
NUTS III regional breakdown used by the CSO for reporting quarterly unemployment ﬁgures (see
Table 5 for the deﬁnition of the NUTS III categories). Dublin accounted for the largest proportion
of primary mortgages in our sample, at 26 percent. The South-West (Kerry and Cork) accounted
for the second largest proportion, at almost 15 percent, while the Mid-East (Kildare, Meath and
5Note: this arrears rate is based on property level payments and debts. Some properties will have multiple loans
where some, but not all, loans are in (90+ days) arrears.
6Note that some degree of judgement was required to allocate buyer categories to some loans.
6Wicklow), accounting for slightly under 13 percent of primary mortgages, ranked third.
3 What do we know about Irish mortgage arrears?
This section addresses two questions: (1) How have mortgage arrears evolved over time; and (2)
What does the loan-level data tell us about accounts that were in arrears at the end of 2010? The
answers to both of these questions will inform our modelling approach later in the paper.
3.1 Trends in Mortgage Arrears
Figure 4 shows the evolution of mortgage arrears between January 2004 and December 2010 for loans
secured on primary dwelling households (“PDH”) alongside the unemployment rate and current loan
to value (LTV) ratios.7 The bottom panel shows annual changes in arrears and unemployment rates.
Mortgages secured against PDHs include loans for ﬁrst-time buyers, next-time buyers (trade-up/-
down) and equity release. The charts show that mortgage arrears increased signiﬁcantly over time
in line with the marked deterioration in the Irish economy. From an extremely low level in 2004 - in
fact, close to zero - arrears increased slowly at ﬁrst from 2007 onwards, and began to take-oﬀ with
the rapid increase in unemployment from early 2008 onwards. Arrears, unemployment and LTVs
have all been moving in broadly the same direction in the last number of years, with the trend in
the latter driven primarily by the collapse in house prices (a trend that has continued into 2011).
Figure 5 shows the evolution of mortgage arrears for buy-to-let/residential investment property
loans (“BTL”). From a very small share of the market in the early part of the decade, this “small”
investor segment increased rapidly during the period of the housing boom, and accounted for around
one-ﬁfth of the total stock of outstanding mortgage balances by the end of 2010. The top panel in
Figure 5 shows the actual arrears rate alongside unemployment and LTV trends, and the bottom
panel shows the annual changes. As with loans secured against primary dwelling households, the
trends all move in a very similar direction. Comparing the BTL and PDH arrears trends, one
observation worth noting is the diﬀerence in the relationship between arrears and unemployment:
relative to PDH loans, the arrears rate for BTL loans responds much more quickly to changes in
unemployment. The diﬀerence could arise for a number of reasons, not least the fact that relative
to PDH borrowers, BTL borrowers may have lower incentives to keep up payments on a property
that they are not actually living in.
3.2 Overview of Borrower and Loan Characteristics (December 2010)
We showed earlier in Table 4 that 5.2 percent of property level accounts were in arrears to the tune
of 90 or more days at the end of December 2010. The outstanding balance on these accounts at
the end of December 2010 was e4.5 billion, while outstanding arrears amounted to e0.25 billion.
7The aggregate trends in this section rely on bank-speciﬁc portfolio information for the four banks. We have
aggregated this using the relative stock of debt in each bank/portfolio as weights.
7Figure 6 shows how the aggregate arrears ﬁgure (of 90+ days past due) breaks down by year of loan
origination, geographic location, buyer type and equity position. The largest proportion of accounts
in arrears was originated in the years 2006 - 2007, accounting for over half of all accounts in such
a condition. In terms of the geographic spread of arrears, loans that were secured on properties
in Dublin account for the largest proportion of arrears, at 21 per cent, with loans originating on
properties located in the Mid-East and Border regions ranking joint second (each accounting for 15
percent of the total). The bottom left panel of Figure 6 shows how arrears are distributed among
the various buyer types. Loans taken out by ﬁrst time buyers account for almost a third of the
number of accounts in arrears at the end of December 2010 while BTL loans account for a quarter.
The chart in the bottom-right panel shows the current loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of accounts in
90+ days past due (DPD) arrears. Just under half of the accounts that were in arrears for 90 or
more days at the end of December 2010 were in a position of positive equity (a CLTV ratio of less
than or equal to 100 percent) while just over half were in a position of negative equity (a CLTV
ratio of over 100 percent).
Figure 7 shows the outstanding balance on accounts in arrears for 90 or more days. The ﬁrst
chart shows the current outstanding balance (left vertical axis) on accounts by year of origination
and geographic location as well as the proportion of the outstanding balance that is in arrears (right
vertical axis). Previously we showed how accounts originating in 2006 and 2007 make up almost
half of the number of accounts in arrears at the end of December 2010. Here we can see that
pattern is similar when we examine the current balance on accounts in arrears. For those accounts
originating in 2006, the outstanding balance on these accounts at the end of December 2010 was
e1.27 billion while the outstanding balance on accounts originating in 2007 was e1.4 billion, so that
over 55 percent of the outstanding balance on all accounts in arrears at the end of December 2010
comprised accounts originating in 2006 and 2007. Arrears on these accounts amount to between 5
and 6 percent of the outstanding balance on these accounts.
The geographic trends are also similar to those presented in Figure 6. Accounts secured on
properties based in the Dublin region make up the largest portion of the outstanding balance on
accounts in arrears (at e1.3 billion or almost 30 percent of the total over the entire sample). The
Mid-East category accounts for 15 percent (e700 million) of the outstanding balance on accounts
in arrears at the end of December 2010, while the Border category accounts for a further 12 percent
(e560 million).
The second chart in Figure 7 shows the current balance outstanding by buyer type. First-time-
buyers who had accounts that were in arrears for 90 or more days at the end of December 2010
made up 30 percent of the total outstanding balance on accounts in arrears over the entire sample,
though this ﬁgure ﬂuctuates slightly when we examine the breakdown in individual years. Buy-to-let
customers account for a further 28 percent over the entire sample, while the remaining 42 percent
is made up of other buyer types.
The ﬁnal chart in Figure 7 shows the breakdown of the outstanding balance on accounts in
arrears by the equity position of the borrower. Again the picture is similar to the one presented
earlier in Figure 6. Over the entire sample, 55 percent of the outstanding balance on accounts in
8arrears is made up of loans secured on properties that were in negative equity at the end of 2010.
This eﬀect is most pronounced for loans originated in 2006 or 2007, when house prices were at or
close to their peak.
In summary, the analysis so far highlights a number of key points which need to be taken into
account in our empirical analysis: Firstly, there appears to be a strong association between recent
trends in arrears and developments in the rate of unemployment. This eﬀect is most pronounced
for buy-to-let customers, but it also exists for borrowers who took out a mortgage to purchase
their principal private dwelling. Secondly, current loan-to-value ratios also appear to be related to
mortgage arrears; both series moved in tandem in recent years, while many of the people who were
in arrears at the end of 2010 were in a position of negative equity. Finally, there are diﬀerences
across borrower types and year of origination in terms of the intensity of arrears.
4 Empirical Approach and Model Results
As discussed in the Introduction, our empirical approach is twofold. As a ﬁrst step, we pool the data
for our four banks and undertake a static probit analysis for December 2010. The purpose of this
step is to identify and quantify the importance of the various factors that impact mortgage arrears in
the Irish case at a point in time. As a second step, we narrow our focus to those borrowers for whom
we have a longer time series of data (monthly June 2008 to Dec 2010) and we undertake a dynamic
panel data analysis. For the panel data analysis we aggregate our individual loan observations to
a portfolio-regional level so that we can incorporate additional key macroeconomic factors, such as
unemployment and house price changes (through LTVs) into the analysis. Our results suggest that
aﬀordability issues and general macroeconomic developments have had an important and sizeable
eﬀect on recent trends in Irish mortgage arrears. Equity considerations, as captured by the LTV
ratio, also appear to have an impact, although our data do not allow us to diﬀerentiate this result
being a reﬂection of general macroeconomic trends as opposed to genuine “equity” eﬀects.
4.1 Four Bank Static Analysis
The independent variables used at this stage of our analysis are described in Table 6. Drawing
on the existing literature on mortgage delinquency, we assess the impact of negative equity and
liquidity factors on the incidence of mortgage arrears in December 2010. The results of our probit
regression are shown in Table 7 where we report the marginal eﬀects and associated standard errors
for our model parameters.
Turning ﬁrst to the variables capturing housing equity, it is interesting to note that the marginal
eﬀects on the loan-to-value ratio are signiﬁcant and monotonic, suggesting that greater levels of
negative equity are associated with an increasing probability of arrears. For example, going from
a current loan-to-value ratio of below 50 percent to one between 110 and 120 percent increases the
probability of going into arrears by 8 percent, while going to a current loan-to-value ratio of over
120 percent increases the probability by 11 percent.
9Much like the LTV, our measure of MRTI (based on updated income from point of loan orig-
ination) enters the regression in a piece-wise fashion. The coeﬃcients on the MRTI variables are
positive, signiﬁcant and monotonically increasing in MRTI. This suggests that ability-to-pay fac-
tors are also important determinants of mortgage arrears, even after controlling for negative equity.
Relative to borrowers with a low MRTI (<0.20), we ﬁnd that borrowers with a high MRTI are
more likely to be in arrears, with a marginal impact of as high as 5 percent for borrowers with an
MRTI greater than 0.50. These results are consistent with the “double-trigger” hypothesis of mort-
gage delinquency, which argues that both negative equity and liquidity considerations are important
determinants of arrears.
Turning to the unemployment dummy variables, the coeﬃcients on these variables are positive
and signiﬁcant. To the extent that changes in local unemployment rates reﬂect the impact of
macroeconomic shocks on the ability or willingness of a borrower to repay his mortgage, the results
suggest that the greater the shock, the larger the impact on the probability of a borrower going into
arrears on his mortgage.
Our results also support the hypothesis that, controlling for other factors such as LTV and
repayment burden, borrower characteristics are important determinants of mortgage repayment
diﬃculties. The coeﬃcients on our “buyer-type” variables suggest that ﬁrst-time buyers are less
likely than other borrowers to go into arrears on their mortgage while those borrowers who took out a
mortgage for buy-to-let purposes are more likely to go into arrears than individuals with a mortgage
on their principal private residence, albeit this marginal eﬀect is relatively small. This result is
interesting and it highlights the need for additional borrower level information in understanding what
drives mortgage repayment behaviour. On the one hand, it may be the case that owner occupiers
simply have other resources from which to meet mortgage repayments (savings, family, etc.) while
non-owner occupiers do not. On the other hand, the results could be picking up diﬀerences in
repayment incentives among the alternative borrower types. Ultimately, any policy response to
address mortgage repayment diﬃculties would need to be based on a thorough exploration of this
issue.
Finally, the bank dummy variables suggest that the probability of arrears diﬀers across the banks
included in our sample. However, it is very diﬃcult to identify the reasons for these diﬀerences with
our current dataset. The diﬀerences across banks could, for example, be due to a varying treatment
of customers in ﬁnancial diﬃculties. It could also be the case that there are diﬀerences in the proﬁle
of mortgagees.
4.2 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
As a next step in our analysis, we model loan delinquency at the portfolio-regional level. The macro
panel data is constructed by aggregating-up the subset of monthly data we have on loan performance
data dating back to mid-2008. By aggregating the data to the regional level we can look at how
macro factors, such as unemployment, income and house prices (through changes in the loan-to-
value ratio) aﬀect the overall arrears trend. Banks and ratings agencies carry out similar types of
10analysis when assessing how the performance of a portfolio of loans changes with key macroeconomic
factors. The approach is also similar to that adopted in Muellbauer et al. (2010) for modelling UK
delinquency trends. However, it is important to point out that whereas Muellbauer et al. (2010)
explicitly control for the ﬂows out of the stock (i.e. defaults) we only look at net changes in the stock.
Given the relatively low level of defaults/repossessions observed in Ireland to date, the analysis of
the change in the stock can broadly be interpreted as an analysis of the determinants of inﬂows to
the stock.8
The macro panel data we construct records the number of accounts in 90-plus days arrears in a
given region on a monthly basis between June 2008 and December 2010 (31 months). In addition to
analysing the data at a regional level, we also estimate separate models for three diﬀerent borrower-
type portfolios: ﬁrst-time buyers (FTB), next-time buyers (NTB) and buy-to-let (BTL). Table 8
shows the evolution of the arrears rate over time for the sample period for each of the portfolio. The
regions are the eight NUTS III regions used by the CSO for the recording of unemployment trends,
as deﬁned in Table 5.
Table 9 presents the summary statistics for the key variables across each of the eight regions.
The arrears ﬁgures relate to the percentage of loans in arrears, whereas the balance and LTV ﬁgures
are all at the property level. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the proportion of accounts in arrears
across each of the regions, with borrowers in both Dublin and the Mid-East faring better, particularly
compared with borrowers in the Border and Midland regions. Interestingly, the Midland region has
been particularly hard hit by the recession, with the rate of unemployment rising from just 4 per
cent in mid-2007 to almost 16 per cent by the end of 2010, some two percentage points higher than
the unemployment rate for the State as a whole. Table 9 also presents the summary statistics for
the diﬀerent borrower-types. Loan performance varies considerably across borrower-type, with ﬁrst-
time (FTB) and next-time buyers (NTB) showing similar patterns of arrears while BTL/RIP buyers
fare worst of all. Again, there are regional diﬀerences to this overall pattern. The table also reports
LTVs, both conditional and unconditional on being in arrears. These are average LTV ﬁgures, the
actual shape of the distribution is also important, as shown in Figure 2 for housing equity. Without
exception, we ﬁnd that the average LTVs are higher for those loans in 90 days arrears. This is a
fairly common ﬁnding in the arrears literature. For Irish borrowers it is not clear whether or not
this observation is capturing borrower characteristics, i.e. those borrowers with higher LTVs are
also more likely to have suﬀered income or employment shocks aﬀecting their ability to pay; or
whether this is capturing a genuine “equity eﬀect”, i.e. these borrowers are eﬀectively exercising the
put-option on their loan.
Given the diﬀerences we observe across the diﬀerent borrower-types, we estimate separate arrears
equations for each type. The basic arrears equation has the following structure:
Ajt = α + β1Aj,t−1 + β2Xjt + ujt (4)
8In Q1 2011, a total of 140 properties in Ireland were repossessed. This accounts for 0.02% of the outstanding
stock of mortgages. At the peak of the early 1990s property crash in the UK, the quarterly rate of repossessions was
close to 0.20%, Muellbauer et al. (2010).
11where Ajt measures the proportion of loans in region j with greater than or equal to 90 days arrears
at time t and Xjt is a matrix of explanatory variables such as unemployment, housing equity,
monthly repayments and rent9. The disturbance term embeds a two-way error component model:
ujt = µi+vjt (Baltagi, 1995), where µi is a region-speciﬁc eﬀect. We include a lag of the dependent
variable and estimate undiﬀerenced, diﬀerenced and dynamic panel data (DPD) regressions, similar
to the approach in Louzis et al. (2010).
In the ﬁrst instance we report the results from a bivariate regression where the dependent
variable is the proportion of accounts in 90-plus days arrears in each region-month. We estimate
undiﬀerenced (top panel) and diﬀerenced speciﬁcations and the regressions are log-log. The results
are summarised in Table 10 for each of the borrower types. The explanatory variables in each
regression are region and time-speciﬁc and are one of: unemployment, current LTV, mortgage-
payment-to-income ratio (MRTI), monthly mortgage payment (BTL only), and rental rates (BTL)
only. The tables only report the coeﬃcients from each bivariate regression, along with standard
errors. For the BTL regression we use average rents in a given region-month, as opposed to average
income, as we think this is a more appropriate measure of “income” for these borrowers.
The bivariate regression results in Table 10 tally closely with the summary statistics and trends
shown earlier. There is a strong positive correlation between unemployment trends and arrears, a
result which holds in both the undiﬀerenced and diﬀerenced speciﬁcations. For BTL loans, unem-
ployment appears to have a much larger (or quicker) impact on arrears trends, as shown by the
relative scale of the coeﬃcients across borrower types. The “long-run” unemployment elasticity, as
estimated in the undiﬀerenced speciﬁcation, is large, ranging from 1.4 for FTB and NTB borrowers,
to 1.9 for BTL borrowers. The short-run elasticity, from the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation, is smaller
(up to 1.1 for BTL borrowers), but still signiﬁcant. For BTL, trends in average regional rents are
negatively correlated with arrears, an economically intuitive result, i.e. as rents rise, loan-portfolio
performance improves. Interestingly, the results for the ﬁrst-diﬀerence bivariate regression indicate
that the relationship between arrears rents and rental rates for the BTL segment is highly elastic,
with a coeﬃcient of -1.8. The third column in Table 10 shows the coeﬃcient on the LTV variable
from each of the bivariate regressions. As expected, from the trends shown earlier, the LTV variable
is highly correlated with arrears. This is a common result in the literature, both in a time-series
setting and when looking at loan-level data, as shown by our earlier results. When we move to the
diﬀerenced speciﬁcation the statistical signiﬁcance of this result tends to fall away, with the excep-
tion of BTL, where the coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant and elastic (1.3) . This would
lead us to believe that, for our owner-occupier segments (FTB and NTB) the undiﬀerenced result
is picking up non-stationarity eﬀects (common trend) rather than a genuine economic relationship.
The fourth column in Table 10 shows the coeﬃcient on the MRTI ratio in each of the bivariate
regressions. In the undiﬀerenced speciﬁcation the MRTI is surprisingly negatively correlated with
arrears for the FTB segment, possibly picky up regional eﬀects. This is conﬁrmed when this result
falls away in the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation.
We next present the results from estimating the full speciﬁcation of equation 4 above, that is,
9We thank Ronan Lyons of Daft.ie for the regional rent time series.
12including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) in a multivariate regression. The inclusion of an LDV
in the regression means that there is a constructed correlation between the LDV and the region
speciﬁc component µj of the error term in equation 4. In order to address this we follow the
standard approach in the literature, where the endogenous variables are instrumented using higher
order lags of themselves. We estimate an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model by GMM, where
LTV, unemployment and rent (BTL only) are each treated as endogenous explanatory variables.
The results from the estimation are shown in Table 11 below.
Turning ﬁrst to the coeﬃcient on the lag of the arrears rate, we see that it is large, positive
and signiﬁcant for all borrower types. Indeed, for all borrower types, in the range of 0.68 to 0.85.
The coeﬃcient on the LDV for BTL borrowers is lowest, at 0.68, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
This relatively large and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the LDV implies large multiplier eﬀects (1/(1-
coeﬀ)) from a change in the arrears rate. In other words, policy interventions to address the rising
arrears rates, through incrementally targeting aﬀordability, unemployment or LTVs will have a
limited impact initially. This is clearly evident in the time-trend which shows arrears rising fairly
relentlessly for the period under investigation. Clearly, the build-up of mortgage arrears over the
last number of years is not a problem that can be solved over a short time-horizon, particularly if
one is relying on a positive macroeconomic environment to contribute to that solution.
Without exception, we ﬁnd that increases in the unemployment rate lead to increases in arrears.
The coeﬃcients for our owner-occupier (FTB and NTB) segments, while signiﬁcant, are relatively
small. For the BTL portfolio we observe a coeﬃcient of 0.45 on unemployment, with no signiﬁcant
eﬀect for the twelve-month lag. We see our unemployment measure acting as a more general “catch-
all” for the macroeconomic conditions in a given region at a point in time. It is perhaps too crude a
measure to get at the “ability-to-pay” question we raised in the Introduction. A more direct measure
of aﬀordability is the ratio of mortgage payments to income (MRTI). Intuitively we would expect
to observe an increase in arrears as the MRTI increases and this is precisely what we ﬁnd for our
main owner-occupier groups. Relative to the other macro factors captured in the model, the MRTI
coeﬃcients are large, 0.34 for FTB and 0.89 for NTB. The MRTI can change for a number of reasons,
although the two main drivers in our sample are changes in the interest rate and changes in average
incomes. To give an idea of the scale of changes that can occur here, between the end of 2008 and
mid-2009, a period when the ECB began to rapidly cut interest rates, we observe that the average
mortgage repayment for NTB borrowers fell from approximately e1,060 to e960 (9.4 percent). This
was also a period when the unemployment rate was rising rapidly, growing at a rate of 0.7 percent
per month on average. Clearly the prevalence of tracker rate mortgages, particularly amongst highly
leveraged borrowers, was acting (and continues to act) as a kind of in-built forbearance holding down
the increase in arrears that might have otherwise occurred.
Turning to the coeﬃcient on the LTV variable, similar to the bivariate diﬀerenced speciﬁcation,
we ﬁnd a weak relationship between LTVs and arrears rates for our owner-occupier segments. LTV
is positive and signiﬁcant in the BTL model (0.40). Overall, we believe that this result, along with
the diﬀerenced bivariate regressions, points to weak evidence for an “equity eﬀect” driving Irish
mortgage arrears trends, to date. This does not necessarily imply that changes in LTVs are not a
13good predictor of changes in arrears rate. The charts in the trends section show that, quite clearly
for the period we look at, they are. One diﬃculty with the model and sample used here is that, as
pointed out above, the trends in our various drivers are correlated over time. When we estimate
a version of the dynamic panel data model (see Table 12) we ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant role for
LTVs in explaining arrears trends. Much like unemployment trends, for the period we look at, we
believe that LTV trends are picking up general changes in the macro-economic environment that
also predict mortgage arrears. Further extensions to our sample period, both further back in time
and updating it for events in 2011 will help clarify the relative impact of the various drivers.
The BTL regression includes a measure of average regional rental rates as an explanatory factor.
We observe a signiﬁcant negative relationship between changes in rents and arrears, in both the
speciﬁcation including unemployment (-0.57) and excluding unemployment (-0.97). This is consis-
tent with our priors that rental rates are negatively related to arrears. In this context, the recent
stabilisation of rental rate trends could be seen as one piece of good news for BTL borrowers.10
In summary, the results in this section tally to a large extent with those from our static probit
analysis. The main exception, however, is that here our LTV variable does not show up as being
signiﬁcant for our owner-occupier segment. The two sets of results could therefore be seen as
conﬂicting but we do not believe this to be the case. Rather, it could be that the LTV eﬀect in the
static analysis is proxying for other things, such as the underlying credit quality of the borrowers in
our dataset for example. In other words, it could be the case that borrowers with little or no equity
are also those who were most stretched at the time of the boom, with fewer lifetime resources or
savings to draw on when harder times hit. Our current dataset does not allow us to address this
issue in more detail, since it contains only a snapshot of information for loans outstanding at the
end of 2010 and does not contain detailed information on the current economic circumstances of
borrowers. However, a more detailed exploration of this issue should be possible in the future, if
further versions of the data are collected along with more detailed current income information for
mortgage holders.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the main drivers of the growth in Irish mortgage
arrears over the last number of years. Our analysis conﬁrms that both housing equity, as measured by
loan-to-value ratios, and measures of aﬀordability are correlated with changes in mortgage arrears.
In our loan-level cross-sectional analysis, we ﬁnd that borrowers with high LTVs and high re-
payment burdens, as measured by the MRTI, are all more likely to be in arrears. In the time-series
data, we observe an arrears rate for BTL roughly double that of owner-occupiers. However, when
we control for the MRTI and LTVs the BTL diﬀerential is reduced. We also ﬁnd that borrowers
living in regions that have suﬀered more severe economic shocks, as proxied for by changes in the
unemployment rate, are also more likely to be in arrears.
10See the Daft.ie Q2 2011 Rental Report, available on Daft.ie.
14Much of what we learn in our cross-sectional loan-level analysis is conﬁrmed by the results from
our panel data analysis, which looks at arrears trends over a longer period of time across eight Irish
regions. The one signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the results is that the LTV eﬀect is not evident for our
owner-occupier segment when we also control for unemployment changes. This leads us to conclude
that, to date, equity considerations have not been a major factor driving Irish mortgage arrears,
and it is aﬀordability issues, along with changes in the general macroeconomic environment, that is
driving developments here. The absence of a strong LTV eﬀect in the panel data analysis could be
seen as conﬂicting with the opposite result we ﬁnd in our cross-sectional loan-level analysis. We do
not believe this is the case. Rather, we believe that the LTV eﬀect in the latter is possibly proxying
for underlying borrower credit quality. In other words, rather than it being the lack of signiﬁcant
equity in the property driving the decision to default, it is the fact that borrowers with little or no
equity are also likely to have been the most stretched at the time of the boom, with fewer lifetime
resources, such as accrued savings, to draw on when harder times hit. We note that this is only
conjecture at this stage, and should be tested by further analysis of the panel data at the loan level.
This is an area of further work which we will undertake, particularly with the collection of new loan
level data for 2011.
The results in our paper can be used to inform the policy debate as to how the build-up of
arrears amongst Irish mortgagees might be addressed and where arrears might go in the future. A
more benign macroeconomic environment would help the situation, particularly in terms of slowing
down the rate of growth of arrears. However, we would caution against expectations of a sudden
drop in the pool of mortgages in arrears: even with a more benign macroeconomic environment, it
is quite clear that reducing the build-up of arrears to date will take a signiﬁcant amount of time,
and resources. A risk factor for the future is the aﬀordability constraint, particularly for owner-
occupiers (FTB and NTB). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and (relatively) large eﬀect for changes in the
MRTI on changes in arrears. Clearly further income or payment shocks could hold back a recovery.
We believe that this is one factor that has driven the increase in arrears throughout 2011 - a period
when the rate of unemployment growth appears to have tailed oﬀ.
The sample period in our analysis does not cover a period when repossessions, formal de-
faults/bankruptcy or any forms of loan restructuring have been a signiﬁcant feature of the Irish
mortgage market. Indeed, in contrast to other countries, such as the US and UK, none of these
factors have ever been a signiﬁcant feature of the Irish mortgage market. Our results indicate that
even if we were to see a signiﬁcant improvement in the macroeconomic environment, the ability of
these factors to signiﬁcantly reduce the pool of arrears that has built-up is likely to be limited in
the short-term. The signiﬁcant income shocks Irish borrowers have faced in recent years means that
there is likely to be a large group of borrowers amongst those in deep arrears that are in a long-term
unsustainable debt position - based on our sample of borrowers, we estimate that 40 percent of
borrowers in 90-plus days arrears have been in that position for a year or more. Addressing the
problems faced by these borrowers should be at the core of any strategy for reducing the pool of
delinquent borrowers. This is likely to represent a signiﬁcant challenge for policy makers and banks
in the coming years.
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Figure 3: Distribution of MRTI
Table 1: Overview of Loan-Level Dataset
Year No. of Total No. of Total
of Accounts Book Primary Book
Origination (%) Value Mortgages Value
(ebn) (%) (ebn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2004 44,540 7.2 34,888 6.5
(10.6) (10.8)
2005 72,634 13.2 56,917 12.0
(17.2) (17.6)
2006 91,458 19.0 70,265 17.1
(21.7) (21.7)
2007 82,658 17.8 63,399 16.2
(19.6) (19.6)
2008 67,195 13.5 49,828 12.2
(15.9) (15.4)
2009 38,668 6.6 28,714 5.9
(9.2) (8.9)
2010 24,737 4.0 19,377 3.6
(5.9) (6.0)
Total 421,890 81 323,388 74
19Unemployment (%)







































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on loan−level data from Banks A, B and C
















































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on loan−level data from Banks A, B and C
(b) Annual changes in arrears and unmployment, buy−to−let
212223Table 2: Overview of Dataset
Borrower type No. of loans No. of properties Balance e(bn) % of the market
Owner occupier 364,239 276,117 57.4 49.0
Buy-to-let 57,651 47,271 11.6 47.0
Total 421,890 323,388 69.0 49.0
90+ days arrears Sample % loans Popn. % loans Sample % balance Popn. %balance
Owner occupier 5.2 5.7 6.1 7.4
Buy-to-let 6.7 9.7 10.9
2
4Table 3: % Change in Gross Household Income from Time t to 2010








25Table 4: Mortgage Characteristics by Year of Loan Origination, Property Account Level (unless otherwise stated)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
(1) Any Arrears (%) (in December 2010) 10.3 13.5 15.2 16.2 13.1 4.8 1.5 12.5
(2) 60 to 90 DPD Arrears (%) (in December 2010) 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.1 1.0
(3) 90+ DPD Arrears (%) (in December 2010) 4.8 5.4 6.6 7.2 5.2 1.2 0.2 5.2
(4) Primary Mortgage Balance at Origination (e000s) 187 211 244 256 245 206 185 228
(5) Total Property Debt at end-2010 (e000s) 168 192 227 242 234 198 182 213
(6) Original LTV 58.8 63.4 64.0 60.2 58.1 60.0 62.2 61.1
(7) Current LTV (end-2010) 59.2 71.0 83.4 86.7 81.3 70.4 64.7 76.6
(8) Mortgage Term (Years) 24 25 26 26 26 26 27 26
(9) Borrower Income at Origination (e000s) 69 71 75 79 80 72 69 75
(10) Borrower Income at end-2010 (e000s) 79 77 75 73 72 70 69 74
(11) MRTI at end-2010 16.8 17.9 18.6 19.7 20.4 19.8 17.9 18.9
Share of loans that are:
(12) First-Time-Buyers 31.1 34.0 39.3 37.2 34.3 44.0 52.1 37.5
(13) Buy-to-Lets 21.1 17.6 17.2 16.2 13.1 7.1 4.6 15.2
(14) Other Buyer Types 47.9 48.5 43.5 46.6 52.6 49.0 43.3 47.3
(15) Fixed Rate Mortgages 14.2 14.6 12.6 9.7 14.7 35.8 61.5 17.9
(16) Tracker Mortgages 43.3 49.9 62.3 74.2 66.6 1.4 0.4 51.9
(17) Variable Rate Mortgages 42.6 35.5 25.1 16.1 18.7 62.7 38.1 30.2
(18) Border Region 10.5 11.2 12.0 12.0 11.4 10.8 9.7 11.4
(19) Dublin Region 27.0 26.1 25.1 24.7 25.6 28.1 31.7 26.2
(20) Mid-East Region 12.4 13.3 13.4 12.4 12.5 12.7 13.3 12.9
(21) Mid-West Region 8.1 7.6 7.3 7.8 7.5 6.8 6.2 7.4
(22) Midlands Region 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.1 5.4 4.6 4.7 5.5
(23) South-East Region 12.3 12.5 12.4 12.8 12.5 12.1 10.8 12.4
(24) South-West Region 15.1 14.5 14.3 14.4 15.7 15.6 14.9 14.8
(25) West Region 9.6 9.3 9.6 9.9 9.5 9.3 8.6 9.5
2
6Table 5: NUTS III Regions
Name of Region County/City Council
Border Region Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan and Sligo
Dublin Region Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown, Fingal, South Dublin and Dublin City Council
Mid-East Region Kildare, Meath and Wicklow
Mid-West Region Clare, North Tipperary, Limerick and Limerick City Council
Midlands Region Laois, Longford, Oﬀaly and Westmeath
South-East Region Carlow, Kilkenny, South Tipperary, Wexford, Waterford and
Waterford City Council
South-West Region Kerry, Cork and Cork City Council
West Region Mayo, Roscommon, Galway and Galway City Council
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃce
27Table 6: Description of Independent Variables
Variable Variable Description
Group Name
Current LTV 50-80% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower has a current
loan-to-value ratio of 50 to 80 percent (i.e. the borrower has positive
equity in the property); 0 otherwise.
80-90% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower has a current
loan-to-value ratio of 80 to 90 percent (i.e. the borrower has positive
equity in the property); 0 otherwise.
90-100% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower has a current
loan-to-value ratio of 90 to 100 percent (i.e. the borrower has positive
equity in the property); 0 otherwise.
100-110% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower has a current
loan-to-value ratio of 100 to 110 percent (i.e. the borrower is in a
position of negative equity); 0 otherwise.
110-120% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower has a current
loan-to-value ratio of 110 to 120 percent (i.e. the borrower is in a
position of negative equity); 0 otherwise.
120%+ Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower has a current
loan-to-value ratio in excess of 120 percent (i.e. the borrower is in a
position of negative equity); 0 otherwise.
Liquidity 20-30% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower’s mortgage repayment
MRTI Ratio (interest plus capital) to income ratio is between 20 and 30%; 0 otherwise.
30-40% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower’s mortgage repayment
(interest plus capital) to income ratio is between 30 and 40%; 0 otherwise.
40-50% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower’s mortgage repayment
(interest plus capital) to income ratio is between 40 and 50%; 0 otherwise.
50%+ Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower’s mortgage repayment
(interest plus capital) to income ratio is 50% or more; 0 otherwise.
Buyer Type FTB Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower was a ﬁrst time
buyer at loan origination and was taking the loan out to purchase their
primary dwelling; 0 otherwise.
BTL Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower was a buy-to-let
customer at loan origination; 0 otherwise.
Unemployment 2% to 6% Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the annual rate of change in the
Change borrower’s local unemployment rate was between 2 and 6 percent; 0 otherwise.
The local unemployment rate is deﬁned as the county in which the borrower’s
property is located.
6%+ Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the annual rate of change in the
borrower’s local unemployment rate was greater than 6 percent; 0 otherwise.
The local unemployment rate is deﬁned as the county in which the borrower’s
property is located.
Bank Bank B Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower is from the property
portfolio of Bank B; 0 otherwise.
Bank C Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower is from the property
portfolio of Bank C; 0 otherwise.
Bank D Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the borrower is from the property
portfolio of Bank D; 0 otherwise.


















First Time Buyer -0.02*** 0.0008
Buy-to-Let 0.00*** 0.0010
Unemployment Change
2% to 6% 0.01*** 0.0008
6%+ 0.03*** 0.0015
Bank
Bank B 0.02*** 0.0013
Bank C 0.04*** 0.0017





Omitted categories for dummy variables: CLTV of less than 50%; MRTI ratio of
less than 20%; Other buyer types; Unemployment change of less than 2%; Bank A.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
29Table 8: Arrears Rate Over Time, by Borrower Type
Borrower type Jun-08 Dec-09 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Dec-10
Loan purpose
First-time buyer (FTB) 1.2 1.4 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.4
Next-time buyer (NTB) 1.3 1.7 2.7 3.6 4.3 5.3
Buy-to-let (BTL) 1.0 1.5 2.9 3.8 4.9 6.0
All borrower types 1.1 1.5 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.8
30Table 9: Summary Statistics - By Region and Loan Purpose
Region Obs % arrears %90d arrears Total Bal. Avg. Bal. Avg. Bal.|90 days arrears Curr. LTV Curr. LTV|90 days arrears
Loan purpose FTB
Border 3006 8.5 4.8 433 144,010 191,744 78.4 100.8
Dublin 7864 5.7 3.0 1,834 233,265 257,373 103.8 121.3
Mid-East 3325 7.7 4.4 659 198,076 246,362 84.2 99.6
Mid-West 3751 7.6 4.8 555 147,971 166,825 79.0 90.3
Midland 2082 10.1 6.3 314 150,977 188,748 82.2 104.9
South East 3230 7.6 4.7 493 152,531 182,853 79.5 92.7
South West 5085 6.2 3.3 848 166,833 188,853 76.8 89.9
West 4399 5.9 3.4 671 152,608 170,873 75.4 87.2
Region Obs % arrears %90d arrears Total Bal. Avg. Bal. Avg. Bal.|90 days arrears Curr. LTV Curr. LTV|90 days arrears
Loan purpose NTB
Border 2673 9.6 6.4 438 164,025 202,484 67.4 81.7
Dublin 9130 6.5 3.7 2,628 287,835 450,668 80.1 90.3
Mid-East 4032 8.6 5.1 882 218,632 311,078 67.6 77.5
Mid-West 3133 8.6 5.5 507 161,749 202,071 66.2 76.7
Midland 1693 10.7 6.7 274 161,660 235,374 68.9 91.1
South East 2983 10.0 6.2 495 165,848 218,828 66.8 83.1
South West 4337 7.4 4.7 801 184,597 231,188 65.2 75.6
West 3278 6.8 4.2 567 173,122 234,609 65.4 78.8
Region Obs % arrears %90d arrears Total Bal. Avg. Bal. Avg. Bal.|90 days arrears Curr. LTV Curr. LTV|90 days arrears
Loan purpose BTL/RIP
Border 2178 10.9 7.1 365 167,681 243,767 80.0 93.9
Dublin 6781 8.8 6.2 2,269 334,555 524,292 100.2 123.2
Mid-East 1552 10.3 6.0 346 222,854 332,400 81.0 94.0
Mid-West 2687 7.5 4.8 503 187,314 279,233 80.2 86.7
Midland 1232 11.6 7.4 232 188,340 304,288 82.4 102.4
South East 2247 8.7 5.0 396 176,429 222,186 80.1 89.3
South West 3891 8.0 5.3 871 223,890 387,172 78.6 90.0
West 3310 9.6 5.9 632 191,012 370,410 75.4 101.1
3
1Table 10: Results from bivariate regressions
Dep. Var. Borr. Type % Unempl. LTV MRTI Payment Rent
At FTB 1.405 2.091 -2.940
At (0.049) (0.174) (0.644)
At NTB 1.443 3.346 1.814
At (0.051) (0.187) (0.793)
At BTL 1.868 4.141 -2.628 -1.295
At (0.071) (0.230) (0.212) (0.161)
Dep. Var. Borr. Type % Unempl. LTV MRTI Payment Rent
∆At FTB 0.289 0.216 0.424
∆At (0.078) (0.302) (0.182)
∆At NTB 0.357 -0.653 1.247
∆At (0.116) (0.414) (0.176)
∆At BTL 1.091 1.266 -1.33 -1.794
∆At (0.143) (0.678) (0.224) (0.496)
Source: Data as of December 2010
FTB: ﬁrst-time buyer; NTB: switchers and next-time buyers; BTL/RIP: buy-to-let or other residential investment property.
32Table 11: Results from Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
FTB NTB BTL
VARIABLES At At At
At−1 0.850*** 0.764*** 0.683***
(0.036) (0.045) (0.035)
LTVt 0.096 0.204 0.391**
(0.134) (0.178) (0.188)
Unemploymentt 0.115*** 0.192*** 0.453***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.058)









Chi2 206.4 188.3 245.5
Prob > Chi2 0.83 0.91 0.18
Observations 232 232 232
Number of regions 8 8 8
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
33Table 12: Results from Dynamic Panel Data Estimation, Excluding Unemployment
FTB NTB BTL
VARIABLES At At At
At−1 0.893*** 0.881*** 0.817***
(0.029) (0.039) (0.028)









Chi2 188.3 182.5 257.5
Prob > Chi2 0.91 0.96 0.087
Observations 232 232 232
Number of regions 8 8 8
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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